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Public goods cooperation abounds in nature, occurring in organisms
ranging from bacteria to humans. Although previous research
focused on the behavioral and ecological conditions favoring co-
operation, the question of whether the molecular and regulatory
properties of the public good itself can inﬂuence selection for
cooperation has received little attention. Using a metapopulation
model, we show that extended molecular durability of a public
good—allowingmultiple reuse across generations—greatly reduces
selection for cheating if (and only if) the production of the public
good is facultatively regulated. To test the apparent synergy be-
tween public goods durability and facultative regulation, we exam-
ined the production of iron-scavenging pyoverdin molecules by the
bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, a cooperative behavior that is
facultatively regulated in response to iron availability.We show that
pyoverdin is a very durable public goodand that extendeddurability
signiﬁcantly enhances ﬁtness. Consistent with our model, we found
that nonsiderophore-producing mutants (cheats) had a relative ﬁt-
ness advantage over siderophore producers (cooperators) when
pyoverdin durabilitywas lowbut notwhen durabilitywas high. This
was because cooperators facultatively reduced their investment in
pyoverdin production when enough pyoverdin had accumulated in
the media—a cost-saving strategy that minimized the ability of
cheats to invade. These ﬁndings show how molecular properties
of cooperative acts can shape the costs and beneﬁts of cooperation.
extracellular products | siderophores | public goods durability | inclusive
ﬁtness | microbes
The joint contribution of individuals to a public good that ben-eﬁts the local community is ubiquitous in nature and occurs in
numerous organisms ranging from bacteria to humans (1–3).
However, explaining the evolution of such cooperation is difﬁcult,
because public goods, although beneﬁcial to the community, can be
exploited by cheating individuals that refrain from making the
costly contribution while still reaping the beneﬁts (4–7). Despite
this dilemma, which predicts the breakdown of cooperation, public
goods cooperation often prevails in nature.
Although numerous behavioral and ecological factors have been
proposed that can provide either direct (self) or indirect (kin-
selected) beneﬁts to cooperators (7–9), the question of whether the
molecular and regulatory properties of the public good itself can
inﬂuence selection for cooperation has received little attention.
Recently, Brown and Taddei (10) showed that the dynamics of
cooperation and cheating are affected when the durability of the
public good (i.e., the extent of multiple reuse of a public good
across generations) is altered. For instance, increased durability
introduced oscillations between cooperators and cheats, charac-
terized by alternate multigenerational epochs of dominance by
cooperators and cheats. However, whether and under what con-
ditions molecular durability inﬂuences selection for cooperation in
nature remains unknown. Addressing this issue is crucial, because
many public goods are durable and persist across generations [e.g.,
microbial exoproducts (3), nest constructions in social animals
(11), and educational, health, and national defense institutions in
human societies (12)]. Furthermore, the results of Brown and
Taddei (10) imply that, all else being equal, evolutionary innova-
tions generating more durable public goods variants will be se-
lected against, because they allow greater proliferation by cheats.
However, what if, in contrast to the assumptions of ref. 10, the
public good is facultatively produced?
To address these issues, we focus on amodel system ofmicrobial
public goods provision, the production of the iron-scavenging
pyoverdin molecule by the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa.
Pyoverdin production is well-understood to be facultatively regu-
lated in response to the severity of iron limitation (13, 14). Iron is
a major limiting growth factor and is actively withheld by hosts
during infections (15, 16). When free iron is scarce, the σ factor
PvdS triggers pyoverdin synthesis, whereas the intracellular accu-
mulation of iron results in the binding of iron to the ferric uptake
regulator (Fur) protein, which represses pvdS promoter activity
and pyoverdin synthesis (17, 18). Pyoverdin can be recycled (19)
and used multiple times (20), which suggests considerable dura-
bility of this public good. Pyoverdin production is a cooperative
trait, because pyoverdin molecules can be shared among neigh-
boring cells, providing beneﬁts to cells other than a focal producer
(21–28). Consequently, pyoverdin can be exploited by cheats that
avoid the cost of production (29) while reaping the beneﬁts by
taking up iron in complex with pyoverdin produced by others.
Using amix of theory and experiment, we show that pyoverdin is
highly durable and readily recyclable after bacterial use. We fur-
ther show that selection for increased durability and cooperation
critically depends on the ability of producers to concurrently
modify their production effort, particularly through the facultative
regulation of production.
Results
Theoretical Model. To understand the interaction between pyo-
verdin durability and its facultative regulation, we developed an
ecological metapopulation model tracking the dynamics of co-
operators (pyoverdin producers) and defectors (nonpyoverdin-
producing cheats), with and without facultative production, over
a range of public goods durability (Fig. S1). We assume that only
cooperators are able to colonize empty patches, whereas coop-
erator patches are in turn vulnerable to colonization and takeover
by migrating or de novo-arising defectors (30).
When pyoverdin production is constitutive (Fig. 1A), we ﬁnd
that the prevalence of cooperators across the metapopulation is
maximized for the most fragile public goods, whereas more du-
rable public goods increase the life expectancy of defector patches
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and the total prevalence of defectors. Thus, we anticipate the
evolution of a molecular planned obsolescence (31) where the
public good is built to fail so as to minimize exploitation by
defectors. Our constitutive model (Fig. 1A) assumes a constancy
of production effort, following an innovation in molecular design.
Thus, more durable molecules would lead to a greater equilibrium
density of public good. In contrast, our facultative model (Fig. 1B)
assumes a constancy of production outcome, and thus, more du-
rable molecules would immediately induce lower production rates
and therefore, a constant equilibrium density of public good.With
facultative regulation, we ﬁnd that very durable public goods now
offer greater security against invasion by cheats, because the costs
of cooperation are minimized (Fig. 1B). In contrast, as durability
decreases, the cost to producers increases (becoming equivalent
to the constitutive model when the public goods decay rate u = 1)
as well as the advantage to cheats.
In Fig. 2, we turn to the temporal dynamics of cooperator–de-
fector competition across a metapopulation. We begin our sim-
ulations with a metapopulation consisting solely of cooperators
(producing a relatively durable public good, u = 0.3) and empty
patches at equilibrium. We now introduce a small proportion of
defectors and track their fate over time. When production is
constitutive (Fig. 2A), defectors have a great initial advantage
because of the accumulation of public goods in each patch and the
continued investment in public goods by cooperators. Rapid
growth of defectors is followed by collapse, because the public
goods that they are reliant on eventually expire; this pattern of
boom and bust continues as a series of damped oscillations until
the equilibrium point is achieved. In contrast, when production is
facultative (Fig. 2B), the pattern of boom and bust is damped by
the ability of cooperators to respond to their social environment
and reduce their costly production in response to the accumula-
tion of the public good in the environment.
Experimental Results. We examined 11 different P. aeruginosa
strains originating from different environmental and clinical
backgrounds (Table S1). Six of these strains produce pyoverdin
type I, whereas three and two strains produce pyoverdin type II and
type III, respectively (three main pyoverdin types, which differ in
the amino acid sequence of their peptide chain, have been char-
acterized for P. aeruginosa so far) (32, 33). For each of these 11
strains, we were in possession of a cheating mutant that produces
Fig. 1. Increased durability favors cooperation in a structured population if
production is facultative. Frequency of cooperator patches (solid lines) and
defector patches (dashed lines) as a function of the rate of public goods
decay, u. (A) Constitutive production by cooperators and (B) facultative
production by cooperators. Parameters are c = d = d0 = 10, e = 1, and m =
m0 = 0.01.
Fig. 2. Facultative producers of durable public goods are more resistant
to oscillations and cheats in a structured population. Time series of co-
operator (solid line) and defector (dashed line) patch frequencies across
a metapopulation. (A) Constitutive production by cooperators and (B)
facultative production by cooperators. Parameters are as for Fig. 1, with
u = 0.3 and metapopulation seeded with 89% cooperator patches and
1% defector patches. Simulations are redrawn as phase diagrams in tri-
angular Inset.
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no or reduced amounts of pyoverdin (27) but is able to take up the
pyoverdin of the corresponding wild-type strain.
Across-strain comparison of pyoverdin durability. Pyoverdin ﬂuoresces
green and can be quantiﬁed in solution as relative ﬂuorescence
units (RFU) (34). We isolated pyoverdin from culture super-
natants and followed RFU over time. We found high levels of
pyoverdin ﬂuorescence being maintained after 48 h for all three
pyoverdin types (type I = 90.4%± 0.8%; type II = 90.7%± 1.1%;
type III = 81.5% ± 1.8%) (Fig. S2), suggesting high durability of
pyoverdin. Despite this overall slow decay, durability was signiﬁ-
cantly lower in strains with pyoverdin type III than in strains with
pyoverdin type I [combined analysis for measures after 6, 24, and
48 h; linearmixedmodel (LMM): t7 =−4.81,P=0.0019] and type
II (LMM: t7 = −5.13, P = 0.0014), whereas there was no signiﬁ-
cant difference between strains with pyoverdin type I and II
(LMM: t7 = 0.32, P = 0.76).
To test whether the persistence of ﬂuorescence levels over time
goes along with the retention of pyoverdin functionality, we con-
ducted growth stimulation assays using pyoverdin of different ages.
We added pyoverdin supernatant on the day of its extraction as
well as 24 and 48 h after the extraction to fresh iron-limited media
(Casamino acids supplemented with human apo-transferrin to
bind free iron)—conditions that require pyoverdin for growth—
and inoculated 105 cells frompyoverdin-defective cheating strains.
We found that pyoverdin remained fully functional, because there
was no signiﬁcant difference in growth (optical density =OD600±
SE) between cultures supplemented with fresh (0.157± 0.033), 24-
h-old (0.158 ± 0.026), and 48-h-old (0.177 ± 0.037) pyoverdin
(LMM across all three pyoverdin types: 0.28 < t39 < 1.98, all
P > 0.05).
Pyoverdin durability in different environments. To test whether pyo-
verdin durability is affected by environmental conditions, we
measured the durability in environments varying in (i) the pres-
ence or absence of nonpyoverdin-producing cheats (i.e., when the
pyoverdin molecule is or is not taken up and recycled by bacteria),
and (ii) low vs. high iron availability, with pyoverdin not being
needed in iron-supplemented (50 μM FeCl3) media. We found
that the durability of pyoverdin was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
both the presence of cheats and the supplementation of iron (Fig.
3). Over a 144-h assay, pyoverdin durability was signiﬁcantly lower
when iron was supplemented (LMM for pyoverdin type I: t42 =
6.06, P < 0.0001; for type II: t42 = 5.38, P < 0.0001; for type III:
t42 = 9.89, P < 0.0001) and was signiﬁcantly lower in the presence
of cheats for pyoverdin type II (LMM: t42 = 4.26, P= 0.0001) but
not for pyoverdin type I (t42 = 1.70, P= 0.096) and type III (t42 =
1.28, P = 0.21). Moreover, there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between the presence of cheats and iron supplementation,
whereby the supplementation of iron decreased the durability
much more in the presence than in the absence of cheats (LMM
for type I: t42 = 3.79, P=0.0005; for type II: t42 = 4.40, P< 0.0001;
for type III: t42 = 2.99, P = 0.0046).
Fitness consequences of pyoverdin durability. We simulated extended
pyoverdin durability by supplementing pyoverdin to the growth
medium, which mimics the presence of durable pyoverdin pro-
duced by a previous generation. In monocultures, we found that
pyoverdin supplementation signiﬁcantly increased culture growth
in all 11 strains (LMM across strains: t129 = 20.3, P < 0.0001) but
increased growth more in cheat than in cooperator monocultures
(signiﬁcant interaction between strain type and pyoverdin sup-
plementation level: t129 = 5.3, P < 0.0001) (Fig. 4). Crucially, we
found that cooperators in pyoverdin-supplemented cultures re-
duced investment in pyoverdin production by 87.9% ± 1.9%
(mean ± SE across 11 strains) compared with cooperator cultures
with no pyoverdin supplementation. This estimate was obtained
by comparing the extra pyoverdin produced per cell in pyoverdin-
supplemented cooperator cultures with the pyoverdin production
per cell in nonsupplemented cooperator cultures (details in
Materials and Methods).
In mixed cultures, the relative ﬁtness of cheats and cooperators
depended on the amount of pyoverdin supplemented (Fig. 5).
Speciﬁcally, cheats did signiﬁcantly better than cooperators in
cultures mimicking low durability of pyoverdin (low quantities of
pyoverdin supplemented). In contrast, cheats lost their competi-
tive advantage when higher quantities of pyoverdin were supple-
mented (Fig. 5).
Fig. 3. Pyoverdin durability alterswith usage and iron availability. The proportion of pyoverdin (±95% conﬁdence interval) remaining in themedium after 24 h
in iron-limited (circles) and 50 μM iron (FeCl3)-supplemented (triangles) cultures, inoculated with either no bacteria (ﬁlled symbols) or nonpyoverdin-producing
bacteria (open symbols). (A) Pyoverdin type I is from strain 1, (B) pyoverdin type II is from strain 11, and (C) pyoverdin type III is from strain 7. Pyoverdin durability
was signiﬁcantly lower when iron was supplemented, and it decreased signiﬁcantly stronger in the presence than in the absence of cheats.
Fig. 4. Increased durability enhances ﬁtness. The effect of pyoverdin (pvd)
supplementation—which mimics the presence of durable pyoverdin produced
by a previous generation—on the growth of cooperator (gray bars) and cheat
(white bars) monocultures. Pyoverdin supplementation signiﬁcantly increased
growth, with growth stimulation being more pronounced in cheat than in
cooperator monocultures in all 11 strain pairs. *P < 0.05. ns, not signiﬁcant.








We show that pyoverdin is an extremely durable and ﬁtness-en-
hancing public good that remains functional for long periods of
time. Experimentally extended pyoverdin durability resulted in
the down-regulation of pyoverdin production by bacteria—a cost-
saving strategy that eliminated the ﬁtness advantage that non-
pyoverdin-producing cheats normally experience in mixed cul-
tures with cooperative pyoverdin producers. Together with the
ﬁndings of our model, our data highlight that facultative pro-
duction of a durable public good represents a powerful mecha-
nism to reduce selection for cheating, because it minimizes the
cost (c) of cooperation while maintaining its beneﬁts (b) (35) and
thereby, contributes to satisfying Hamilton’s rule for the evolution
of cooperation: rb> c, where r is the relatedness between the actor
and the beneﬁciary of a cooperative act (36). This two-pronged
mechanism (durability plus facultative control) could potentially
contribute to the evolutionary stability of numerous bacterial ex-
tracellular public goods (3).
Producing something that is durable and can continue to deliver
beneﬁts would seem obviously preferable to producing something
ephemeral. In a social context, the beneﬁts of durability may even
be magniﬁed, because the beneﬁts can accrue not only to con-
temporary kin but also to descendent kin that are not yet even born
(37). However, our model shows that when all else is equal, the
constitutive production of more durable public goods does not
favor cooperation, because defectors can thrive on their patches
for extended periods of time without suffering a loss of social
beneﬁts (Fig. 1A) (10). This leads to the counterintuitive result that
the constitutive production of something more durable is un-
favorable in a social context. We then show that this problem can
be solved when the public good is facultatively produced (Fig. 1B).
The reason for this is that the production costs (proportional to c in
Hamilton’s rule) can now be immediately mitigated after the in-
novation of a more durable public good such that they need only to
be paid brieﬂy on colonization of an empty patch. Thus, regulatory
control can temporally decouple investment into the public good
by cooperators (early in colonization when r is high and beneﬁts of
cooperation accrue to producers exclusively) and subsequent
competition between cooperators and cheats (i.e., when r is low).
Consequently, after the cost for the public good has been paid
during colonization, the resident cooperators are competitively in
a strong position to withstand the challenge of any defector mutant
or migrant. Empirical ﬁndings suggest that a decoupling between
investment into the public good and effective competition is ac-
tually taking place: the highest investment in pyoverdin production
occurs at low cell densities (i.e., on colonization) (14), conditions
under which cheats have limited access to the public good and
consequently, have a hard time competing and invading (26).
Our results reveal that durability of pyoverdin type III is signif-
icantly reduced compared with pyoverdin types I and II (Fig. S2).
Interestingly, this pattern correlates with the abundance of the
pyoverdin types across both natural and clinical isolates, with the
more fragile type III pyoverdins being the least common (29, 33).
This raises the question of whether increased durability provides
a competitive advantage. It has been suggested that the pyoverdin
locus is under diversifying selection (32), with altered pyoverdin
structures possibly being a measure to limit access to the public
good to close relatives (i.e., clonemates). Any structural changes to
pyoverdin may, in turn, modify the robustness of the molecule and
thus, contribute to the diversity in durability among types I–III. It is
also possible that durability is itself under direct selection, with the
direction of selection depending on prevailing ecological con-
ditions and also the nature of regulatory control over pyoverdin
production. The synergy between the beneﬁts of regulation and
durability entails that neither trait can be properly considered in
isolation, and we have a multidimensional social dilemma (38),
with increasing durability only favored when regulatory control of
the public good is sufﬁciently developed. By introducing variable
degrees of regulatory efﬁciency (SI Text), we show that the regu-
latory threshold for durability selection depends on the rate of
disturbance. Speciﬁcally, when the risk of environmental pertur-
bation is low (e.g., chronic infections) and therefore, the burden of
cheats is high (39), very precise regulation is required before se-
lection can favor more durable public goods (Fig. S3).
We found that the durability of pyoverdin was not only inﬂu-
enced by its molecular design (pyoverdin type) but also by envi-
ronmental factors such as iron concentration (Fig. 3). The more
rapid degradation of pyoverdin in iron-rich media in the presence
of bacteria suggests that bacteria consume pyoverdin when the
molecule becomes redundant. Consumption of a public good by
individuals of the same or a different species may be an important
factor, reducing its durability in environmental settings. Further-
more, other factors such as a high diffusion rate might signiﬁcantly
reduce reusability even when the public good is molecularly du-
rable, because diffusion leaches the public good away from its
producers (24, 40). Ecological conditions that determine public
goods diffusion are, therefore, likely to determine reusability and
the selection for cooperation. For instance, our previous work
showed that media viscosity reduces pyoverdin diffusion, thereby
increasing selection for cooperation (24). More generally, un-
derstanding how production, consumption, degradation, and dif-
fusion combine to shape the dynamics of microbial public goods
promises a range of insights into the ecology and evolution of mi-
crobial cooperation. Given the coupling between microbial co-
operation and virulence (22, 41, 42), more detailed understanding
of the dynamics of microbial social behaviors can, in turn, open
strategies of pathogen control (43).
Materials and Methods
Strains.We used 11 different P. aeruginosa strains originating from different
environmental and clinical backgrounds (Table S1). Six of these strains pro-
duce pyoverdin type I, whereas three and two strains produce pyoverdin type
Fig. 5. Increased durability reduces selection for cheats. Outcome of 24-h
competition assays between cheats and cooperators in cultures supplemented
with different quantities of pyoverdin (i.e., mimicking different durability):
(A) for strain 1, pyoverdin type I, and (B) for strain 11, pyoverdin type II. Stars
inside symbols indicate values signiﬁcantly different from 1.
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II and type III, respectively. Pyoverdin consists of a conserved ﬂuorescent
chromophore linked to a short peptide, with the pyoverdin types I, II, and III
differing in the amino composition of their peptide chain (18). For each of
these 11 strains, wewere in possession of a cheatingmutant that produced no
or reduced amounts of pyoverdin (27). As the reference wild type–mutant
(i.e., cooperator–cheat) pair, we used strain PAO1 (pyoverdin type I, ATCC
15692; ATCC) and the knockout mutant (PAO1ΔpvdD), which was directly
derived from PAO1 and is unable to produce pyoverdin because the peptide
synthetase (pvdD) is knocked out (44). Moreover, we used the strain pair
PAO6049-PAO9(PAO6609), where PAO6049 is a methione auxotrophe deri-
vate from PAO1 but a wild-type pyoverdin producer and PAO9 is a pyoverdin-
deﬁcient mutant derived by UV mutagenesis from PAO6049 (45). For the
other nine wild types, spontaneous pyoverdin-defective mutants have been
isolated and characterized by Jiricny et al. (27).
Extraction of Pyoverdin. To stimulate pyoverdin production, we grewwild-type
strains for 24 h at 37 °C in a shaken incubator in 30-mL glass vials containing
6 mL minimal-iron casamino acids (CAA) media (5 g casamino acids, 1.18 g
K2HPO4*3 H2O, 0.25 g MgSO4*7 H2O per liter) supplemented with 20 mM
NaHCO3 (sodium bicarbonate) and 100 μg/mL human apo-transferrin (Sigma).
Apo-transferrin is a powerful natural iron chelator that binds free Fe(III) in
the presence of bicarbonate and prevents nonsiderophore-mediated uptake
of iron by bacteria (46). After growth, we centrifuged aliquots of 1 mL in
Eppendorf tubesat13,835×g for10minandpassedthe supernatant containing
pyoverdin throughamicroﬁlter (SartoriusMinisart, pore size=0.2μm;Sartorius)
for sterilization. Besides pyoverdin, this sterile supernatant containsmany other
metabolic compounds secretedbybacteria, andmeasuring pyoverdin durability
under these biochemical conditions reﬂects the natural situation.
Measuring Pyoverdin Durability. Pyoverdin ﬂuoresces green and can be quan-
tiﬁedinsolutionasRFUusingaﬂuorimetre(excitation:400nm,emission:460nm;
SpectraMax M2; Molecular Devices) (34). We transferred 100 μL of the ﬁltered
supernatant into individual wells on a 96-well microtitre plate, incubated the
plate at 37 °C (the optimal growth temperature of P. aeruginosa at which
pyoverdin is produced abundantly in iron-limitedmedium) in a static incubator,
and measured RFU at incubation time followed by measures after 1, 6, 24, and
48 h. RFU measurements were taken from nine (1, 6, and 24 h) and three (48 h)
independent replicates for all 11 cooperator strains.Wemeasured thedurability
of pyoverdin as RFUt = x/RFUt = 1, which represents the proportion of pyoverdin
remaining in the medium over a given time interval (x − 1 h). Preliminary
experiments revealed that pyoverdin is highly sensitive to shaking [mean pro-
portion of maintained pyoverdin ﬂuorescence after 6 h: shaken at 1.1 × g =
0.35± 0.02, static = 0.95± 0.01, LMM (linearmixedmodel): t8 = 34.0, P< 0.0001],
andwhenwestudieddecay in static culture (thebiologically relevant condition),
we discarded the ﬁrst hour after sample preparation involving shaking.
To test whether pyoverdin remains functional over time, we conducted
growth stimulation assays using pyoverdin of different ages. We added 100
μL pyoverdin supernatant on the day of its extraction as well as 24 and 48 h
after the extraction (stored at 37 °C) to 100 μL fresh CAA media inoculated
with 105 cells of the corresponding cheater strain. We measured culture
growth 24 h after inoculation at 600 nm using SpectraMax M2 and com-
pared growth between the different age classes of pyoverdin.
Measuring Pyoverdin Durability in Different Environments. We measured the
durabilityofpyoverdinunderdifferent environmental conditionsby varying (i)
thepresence or absence of cheats, and (ii) the iron content of themedia (50 μM
FeCl3 vs. no iron supplementation). Each treatment was independently repli-
cated three times for all three pyoverdin types: type I (strain 1), type II (strain
11), and type III (strain 7) (details in Table S1). We transferred 100 μL of the
ﬁltered supernatant into individualwells on a 96-wellmicrotitre platewith 100
μL fresh CAA media and supplemented wells with (i) 105 cells of the cheater
strain fromovernight CAA culture, (ii) 50 μMFeCl3, (iii) 105 cheater cells and 50
μM FeCl3, or (iv) nothing. We incubated the plate at 37 °C in a static incubator
andmeasured RFU at incubation time, followed bymeasures after 1, 6, 24, 48,
72, and 144 h. Evaporation of the medium occurring during incubation results
in increasing overestimations of RFU with longer incubation times. This effect
could particularly be seen in treatmentwhere the effect of pyoverdin decay on
RFU was weaker than the effect of evaporation. Pyoverdin of all three types
decayed at a constant rate under the condition where pyoverdin is taken up
and recycled by bacteria in iron-limited media (linear regression on logarith-
mically transformeddecay values; type I:R2 = 0.854, F1,13 = 82.6,P<0.0001; type
II: R2 = 0.862, F1,13 = 88.3, P< 0.0001; type III:R
2 = 0.837, F1,13 = 72.7, P< 0.0001).
Effects of Pyoverdin Durability on Monoculture Fitness. To assess the con-
sequences of extended pyoverdin durability (mimicked by pyoverdin sup-
plementation) on ﬁtness of cooperator and cheat strains in monocultures, we
carried out an experiment with four treatments: (i) 200 μL fresh CAA media
inoculated with 105 cooperator cells, (ii) 200 μL fresh CAA media inoculated
with 105 cheat cells, (iii) 50 μL of pyoverdin supernatant + 150 μL fresh CAA
media with 105 cooperator cells, or (iv) 50 μL of pyoverdin supernatant + 150
μL fresh CAA media with 105 cheat cells. This experiment involved four
replications for all 11 cooperator–cheat strain pairs. Culture growth was
measured as optical density at 600 nm after 24 h.
To investigate whether the supplementation of pyoverdin resulted
in reduced pyoverdin investment by cooperators, we compared RFUt = 24 /
OD600 nm (i.e., an estimate of the amount of pyoverdin produced per cell)
(14) in nonpyoverdin-supplemented cooperator monocultures with the
extra pyoverdin produced per cell in pyoverdin-supplemented cooperator
monocultures. A proxy for the extra pyoverdin produced per cooperator
cells in pyoverdin-supplemented cultures is given by [(RFUt = 24 in pyoverdin-
supplemented cooperator cultures) − (RFUt = 24 in pyoverdin-supplemented
cheat cultures)]/(OD600 nm in pyoverdin-supplemented cooperator cultures).
OD is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with cfu per milliliter across the
OD range used here (Pearson’s product moment correlation: r = 0.973, df =
30, P < 0.0001).
Effects of Pyoverdin Durability on Fitness in Mixed Cultures. We conducted
competition assays between cooperator and cheat strains by inoculating 105
bacteria at a 1:1 ratio into CAA supplemented with various amounts of
pyoverdin. Speciﬁcally, we supplemented 0, 5, 10, 25, and 50 μL of pyoverdin
supernatant to 200, 195, 190, 175, and 150 μL CAA, respectively. Each ex-
perimental treatment was independently replicated 8 to 12 times for all
three pyoverdin types (type I: strain 1; type II: strain 11; type III: strain 7).
After a 24-h competition period, cultures were individually diluted and
plated on King’s B medium (KB) and incubated overnight in a static in-
cubator at 37 °C. We then quantiﬁed the number of cooperator and cheat
cfu on each plate and calculated the relative ﬁtness of cheats: v = [x2 (1 − x1)]/
[x1 (1 − x2)], where x1 is the initial proportion of cheats and x2 is their ﬁnal
proportion (23). Colonies of cooperators and cheats can usually be distin-
guished based on color differences: cooperator colonies are green because
of the presence of ﬂuorescent pyoverdin molecules, whereas cheater colo-
nies are whitish because of the absence of pyoverdin (24, 27). Unfortunately,
we were unable to reliably tell apart the colonies of strain 7 and its mutant,
because the pyoverdin-defective mutant of strain 7 turned out to be phe-
notypically polymorphic.
Statistical Analyses. We used LMM to test whether pyoverdin durability
differs between pyoverdin types, environmental conditions, and iron-
supplementation treatments. Before analysis, we arcsine-transformed our
estimatesofpyoverdindurability toaccount for theproportionalnatureofour
variable and hence, to render the variance independent of the mean.
Whenever applicable, we introduced the strain identiﬁcation, replicate
number, or time interval as a random factor into ourmodels to control for the
fact that repeatedmeasureswere taken from the same pyoverdin type, strain,
or culture, respectively. We further introduced RFUt = 1 as a covariate in our
models. This was done, because RFUt = 1 measures from supernatants varied
between strains (RFUt = 1: mean ± SE = 1,627 ± 74, range = 1,194–2,038).
However, RFUt = 1 had no signiﬁcant effect on any of our response variables
(P≥ 0.32 for all analysis), showing that differences in RFUt = 1 did not inﬂuence
our results. Finally, we used the false-discovery rate (FDR) control method to
adjust the nominal = 0.05 in posthoc pair-wise comparisons. All statistical
computations were carried out with R 2.10.1 (http://www.r-project.org/).
Model. Our model tracks the dynamics of three distinct patch types charac-
terized by their occupants, empty (with prevalence E), cooperator only (with
prevalence C), and defector only (with prevalence D), building on the meta-
population models by Levins (47) describing the dynamics of subpopulations
within a metapopulation (30, 47). We assume that defectors always displace
cooperators if they co-occur within a patch (i.e., the patches are well-mixed,
and the cooperative provision of the public good entails a direct cost, en-
suring a local tragedy of the commons) (4, 5) and that the dynamics of strain
replacement are sufﬁciently fast that we can reducewithin-patch dynamics to
simple transition rates among the single strain states. Our model tracks three
classes of transition events: colonization of empty patches (by cooperators),
extinction of occupied patches (at a higher rate for defector patches), and
replacement of cooperators by defectors (because of both transmission of
defectors and de novo mutation).
These transition events deﬁne the following system of ordinary dif-
ferential equations, controlled by cooperator and defector transmission rates







c and d, patch extinction rate e, cooperator to defector mutation and re-
placement rate m, and public good decay rate u (Eqs. 1–4):
dE=dt ¼ eðCþ DÞ  cCE þ uD [1]
dC=dt ¼ cCE eC  ðdDþmÞC [2]
dD=dt ¼ ðdDþmÞC  ðuþ eÞD [3]
E þ C þ D ¼ 1: [4]
To introducefacultativeproductionofapublicgood,weconsider that therates
of within-patch cooperator replacement by defectors (whether arising from
spontaneous mutation or colonization) will decrease for more durable public
goods, because thecostsofproduction (driving cheat replacement)will onlybe
paid intermittently. Speciﬁcally,weassume thatdandmare positive functions
of u so that fragile public goods ensure a high (i.e., constant) production cost
and therefore, high rates of replacement by cheats. In Fig. 1B, we specify that
d = d0 u and m = m0 u, ensuring coexistence whenever c > e + m0 u. More
detailed model exposition and analysis are presented in SI Text.
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